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et al.: Self-Incrimination
SELF-INCRIMINATION

advise the witness to consult with an attorney. The jurisdictions
are also consistent in deciding that it is proper to instruct a jury
that a defense witness' refusal to answer questions on selfincrimination grounds during cross-examination may be
considered in weighing the witness' credibility.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Hendricks 4 9
(decided August 19, 1996)

Defendant, John Hendricks, appealed his conviction of
attempted rape and claimed that the trial court erred when it
permitted the prosecution to introduce police testimony
concerning an oral statement that the defendant allegedly made to
the police because it violated his fundamental and basic
constitutional right to remain silent. 50 The Appellate Division,
Second Department, affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held that, since the defendant never invoked his right to remain
silent, the admission of Detective Kenneth Diehm's testimony did
not constitute an improper reference to defendant's exercise of
his privilege against self-incrimination. 5 1
At trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Detective
Diehm who interviewed the defendant after his arrest on charges
49. 222 A.D.2d 74, 646 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1996).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
51. Hendricks, 222 A.D.2d at 81, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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of attempted rape of his live-in girlfriend. 52 The testimony
included a question by the prosecutor to Detective Diehm
regarding what he said to the defendant and what the defendant
responded. 53 The detective testified that he told the defendant
that he wanted to take a detailed statement as to what had
transpired. 54 The defendant replied: "I'll talk to you, but I am
not signing anything else." 55 Upon cross-examination of the
defendant, the defendant testified that when Detective Diehm
asked him if he wanted to read the Miranda56 card and write a
statement, he replied "I am not in a position to write a
statement. ,,57
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
admitting Detective Diehm's testimony because it violated his
constitutional right to remain silent. 58 The court disagreed with
the defendant, finding that his argument "misapprehend[ed] both
the nature and context of his statement as well as the applicable
59
case law.,,
A defendant has the constitutional right not to incriminate him
or herself under both the United States Constitution and the New
York State Constitution. In the landmark case of Miranda v.
Arizona, the United States Supreme Court stated "it is
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation and ... the prosecution may not ... use at trial the
fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of
60
accusation."

52. Id. at 75, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46.
53. Id. at 76, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
54. Id. at 77, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
55. Id.
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. Hendricks, 222 A.D.2d at 77, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
58. Id. at 77-78, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
59. Id. at 78, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
60. Hendricks, 222 A.D.2d at 77, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966)).
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Likewise, in Griffin v. California,6 1 the defendant

959
was

murder. 62

convicted of first degree
During the trial, both the
trial court and prosecutor made comments in reference to
defendant's failure to testify. 63 The Supreme Court held that the

comments made by the trial court and prosecutor in reference to
the defendant's failure to testify constituted reversible error. 64 In
reversing the defendant's convictions, the Supreme Court based
its decision on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 65 The Court stated that comment on a defendant's
"refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of
66
criminal justice' . . . which the Fifth Amendment outlaws."

The Court concluded by stating that "the Fifth Amendment, in its
direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing
on the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids
either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt." 67
In People v. Von Werne, 68 the petitioner, Herbert Von Werne,
was convicted of "two counts of criminal possession of stolen
property in the second degree, illegal possession of a vehicle
identification number plate and unauthorized use of a vehicle."69
During the trial, a police officer was permitted to testify that the
defendant had exercised his constitutional right to remain silent
during police interrogation after initially answering questions. 70
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
appellate division and ordered a new trial holding that the
admission of the defendant's election to exercise his right against
1
self-incrimination was error. 7
61. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
62. Id. at 609.
63. Id. at 609-11.
64. Id. at 613.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 614.
67. Id. at 615.
68. 41 N.Y.2d 584, 362 N.E.2d 982, 394 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1977).
69. Id. at 585, 362 N.E.2d at 983, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
70. Id. at 587, 362 N.E.2d at 984, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
71. Id. at 590, 362 N.E.2d at 986-987, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 188. The court in
Von Weme stated "[t]he only apparent purpose of informing the jury that the
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In the more recent case of People v. Scalerico,72 evidence of
defendant's initial request to give a written statement and
subsequent refusal, was admitted into evidence. 73 The appellate
division reversed, holding that the admission constituted
reversible error. 74
The Hendricks court distinguished the Hendricks case from
both Von Werne and Scalerico. The court determined that,
unlike those cases, the statement of the defendant refusing to sign
a written statement was not made with the intent to end
questioning. 75 Instead, the defendant had been advised of his
Miranda rights and subsequently began talking. 76 The Hendricks
court reasoned that this showed that the defendant failed to
77
indicate an intent to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights.
The Hendricks court cited People v. Topping,78 where the
defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights, made
detailed oral and written statements. 79 At trial, the defendant
argued that his refusal to have his statements recorded consisted
of an assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. 80 However, the
81
appellate division rejected the defendant's argument.
defendant had elected to remain silent during police interrogation is to permit

them to infer consciousness of guilt. The use of such proof for this, its only
purpose, is not permissible." Id. at 588, 362 N.E.2d at 985, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
186.
72. 140 A.D.2d 386, 388, 527 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (2d Dep't 1988)
(finding that although the detective properly testified to the defendant's oral
admissions, it was error to introduce testimony that the defendant initially
agreed to give a written statement but later refused).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Hendricks, 222 A.D.2d at 80, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 74 A.D.2d 703, 426 N.Y.S.2d 116 (3d Dep't 1980).
79. Id. at 703, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
80. Id.
81. Id., 426 N.Y.S.2d at 117. The court stated that the "[diefendant's
mere refusal to have his statements recorded, when preceded by oral
statements and followed by a written statement, can in no way be construed as
an assertion of the right to remain silent." Id. at 703-04, 426 N.Y.S.2d at
117. See People v. Sims, 135 A.D.2d 591, 522 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/42

4

et al.: Self-Incrimination

19971

SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Hendricks court found that, because the defendant John
Hendricks never invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent, his oral confession was thus properly admitted. 82 The
court added that, even if the trial court had erred by permitting
Detective Diehm to testify concerning the defendant's refusal to
83
sign a written statement, such error would be deemed harmless.
In sum, under both the Federal and New York Constitutions, a
defendant in a criminal case has the right to refuse to incriminate
himself or herself. Additionally, the assertion of a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights, after arrest, may not be used against
him.

1987). In Sins, the court rejected defendant's argument that his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated when a detective testified that defendant
refused to sign a confession after orally admitting to the crime. Id. at 592. 522
N.Y.S.2d at 172. The court stated that "[t]he defendant's oral confession had
already been admitted in evidence as it was found that he had voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights. His refusal to sign a written waiver does not. as a
matter of law, preclude a finding of a waiver of those rights. Id.
82. Hendricks, 222 A.D.2d at 81, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
83. Id.
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